Abstract. A fixed-pattern padding consists in concatenating to the message m a fixed pattern P . The RSA signature is then obtained by computing (P |m) d mod N where d is the private exponent and N the modulus. In Eurocrypt '97, Girault and Misarsky showed that the size of P must be at least half the size of N (in other words the parameter configurations |P | < |N |/2 are insecure) but the security of RSA fixedpattern padding remained unknown for |P | > |N |/2. In this paper we show that the size of P must be at least two-thirds of the size of N , i.e. we show that |P | < 2|N |/3 is insecure.
Introduction
RSA was invented in 1977 by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [8] , and is now the most widely used public-key cryptosytem. RSA is commonly used for providing privacy and authenticity of digital data, and securing web traffic between servers and browsers.
A very common practice for signing with RSA is to first hash the message, add some padding, and then raise the result to the power of the decryption exponent. This paradigm is the basis of numerous standards such as PKCS #1 v2.0 [9] .
In this paper, we consider RSA signatures with fixed-pattern padding, without using a hash function. To sign a message m, the signer concatenates a fixed padding P to the message, and the signature is obtained by where d is the private exponent and N the modulus. More generally, we consider RSA signatures in which a simple affine redundancy is used. To sign a message m, the signer first computes:
w is the multiplicative redundancy a is the additive redundancy
The signature of m is then:
A left-padded redundancy scheme P |m is obtained by taking ω = 1 and a = P · 2 , whereas a right-padding redundancy scheme m|P is obtained by taking ω = 2 and a = P . No proof of security is known for RSA signatures with affine redundancy, and several attacks on such formats have appeared (see [6] for a thorough survey). At Crypto '85, De Jonge and Chaum [1] exhibited a multiplicative attack against RSA signatures with affine redundancy, based on the extended Euclidean algorithm. Their attack applies when the multiplicative redundancy ω is equal to one and the size of the message is at least two-thirds of the size of the RSA modulus N . De Jonge and Chaum's attack was extended by Girault and Misarsky [2] at Eurocrypt '97, using Okamoto-Shiraishi's algorithm [7] , which is an extension of the extended Euclidean algorithm. They increased the field of application of multiplicative attacks on RSA signatures with affine redundancy as their attack applies to any value of ω and a, when the size of the message is at least half the size of the modulus (refer to figure 2 for an illustration): Girault and Misarsky also extended the multiplicative attacks to RSA signatures with modular redundancy:
where ω 1 , ω 2 is the multiplicative redundancy, a is the additive redundancy and b is the modular redundancy. In this case, the size of the message must be at least half the size of the modulus plus the size of the modular redundancy.
Finally, Girault and Misarsky's attack was extended by Misarsky [5] at Crypto '97 to a redundancy function in which the message m and the modular redundancy m mod b can be split into different parts, using the LLL algorithm [4] . The attack applies when the size of the message is at least half the size of the modulus plus the size of the modular redundancy.
In this paper, we extend Girault and Misarsky's attack against RSA signatures with affine redundancy to messages of size as small as one third of the size of the modulus, as illustrated in figure 3 .
As Girault and Misarsky's attack, our attack applies for any w and a and runs in polynomial time. However, our attack is existential only, as we cannot choose the message the signature of which we forge, whereas Girault and Misarsky's attack is selective: they can choose the message which signature is forged.
In this section we extend Girault and Misarsky's multiplicative attack on RSA signatures with affine redundancy, to messages of size as small as one third of the size of N . A multiplicative attack is an attack in which the redundancy function of a message can be expressed as a multiplicative combination of the redundancy functions of other messages. So we look for four distinct messages m 1 , m 2 , m 3 and m 4 , each as small as one third of the size of the modulus, such that:
Then, using the signatures of m 2 , m 3 and m 4 , one can forge the signature of m 1 by:
From (3) we obtain:
Denoting P = a/ω mod N , we obtain:
and letting:
we obtain:
((P + t) + x) · ((P + t) + y) = (P + t) · ((P + t) + x + y + z) mod N which simplifies into:
Our goal is consequently to find four integers x, y, z and t, each as small as one third of the size of N , satisfying equation (5).
First, we obtain two integers z and u such that
As noted in [3] , this is equivalent to finding a good approximation of the fraction P/N , and can be done efficiently by developing it in continued fractions, i.e. applying the extended Euclidean algorithm to P and N . A solution is found such that |z| < Z and 0 < u < U if Z · U > N , which is the case here with Z = N 1 3 and U = 2 · N 2 3 . We then select an integer y such that N 1 3 ≤ y ≤ 2·N 1 3 and gcd(y, z) = 1. We find the non-negative integer t < y such that: t · z = −u mod y which is possible since gcd(y, z) = 1. Then we take
and obtain:
which gives equation (5), with x, y, z and t being all smaller than 4 · N . From x, y, z, t we derive using (4) four messages m 1 , m 2 , m 3 and m 4 , each of size one third the size of N :
Since −N 1/3 < z < N 1/3 and y ≥ N 1/3 , we have y + z > 0, which gives using u ≥ 0 :
which shows that the four integers m 1 , m 2 , m 3 and m 3 are non-negative, and we have
The complexity of our attack is polynomial in the size of N . In the appendix we give an example of such a forgery computed using RSA Laboratories' official 1024-bits challenge-modulus RSA-309.
Extension to Selective Forgery
The attack of the previous section is only existential: we can not choose the message to be forged. In this section we show how we can make the forgery selective, but in this case the attack is no longer polynomial. Let m 3 be the message which signature must be forged. Letting x, y, z and t as in (4), we compute two integers z and u such that
We then factor u, and try to write u as the product x · y of two integers of roughly the same size, so that eventually we have four integers x, y, z, t of size roughly one third of the size of the modulus, with:
x · y = (P + t) · z mod N which gives again
The signature of m 3 can now be forged using the signatures of m 1 , m 2 and m 4 . For a 512-bit modulus the selective forgery attack is truly practical. For a 1024-bit modulus the attack is more demanding but was still implemented with success.
Conclusion
We have extended Girault and Misarsky's attack on RSA signatures with affine redundancy: we described a chosen message attack against RSA signatures with affine redundancy for messages as small as one third of the size of the modulus. Consequently, when using a fixed padding P |m or m|P , the size of P must be at least two-thirds of the size of N . Our attack is polynomial in the length of the modulus. It remains an open problem to extend this attack to even smaller messages (or, equivalently, to bigger fixed-pattern constants): we do not know if there exists a polynomial time attack against RSA signatures with affine redundancy for messages shorter than one third of the size of the modulus. However, we think that exploring to what extent affine padding is malleable increases our understanding of RSA's properties and limitations.
